Remote by design

How to sign a contract remotely — no printer, no account

Distance should not have to change evidence. You send a contract for signature online; the counterparty opens a link on their phone, proves their identity with a one-time code, signs — and the file comes back sealed, with the whole verification trail attached to it.

The short answer

Pick a signing platform, upload the contract, add each party with their contact details, and send. Every signer opens a single-use link, verifies with a code sent by SMS or email, signs on the canvas, and the envelope returns a sealed PAdES PDF plus a hash-chained audit trail to the sender.

What “no sign up” really means

Signers need nothing installed and no account: they open a link from their phone or browser, verify with a one-time code, and sign. The one who holds the account is whoever sends the contract — the organisation — because it is the sender that carries the retention duties and the evidence pack.

Technically, the signer's only credential is the link itself: a unique single-use token dispatched over a TLS-protected endpoint. Once used, it is spent — it cannot be replayed by whoever might see it next.

The identity checks behind a remote signing

The ceremony binds, in order: the invite (single-use token), the possession of the phone (a 6-digit one-time code received and re-entered), and the session context (truncated IP address and device details bound to the verification claim). Each of these becomes a line in the audit trail — recorded as the ceremony happens, not reconstructed afterwards.

For anyone doubting what happened later, the hash-chained audit trail plus the sealed document answer the question without needing anyone's recollection: the chain links every event to the previous one, and any tampering breaks the chain visibly.

The signing itself, and the languages around it

The signer draws their visual mark over the document's canvas; the platform anchors an embedded signing trace with it and signs. The ceremony follows the signer's preferred language — on a remote deal, the counterparty may only share a language with your paperwork, not with your office.

What you get that email never gave

A signed PDF attached to an email is an image of an intention: no digest binds the scanner's output to what was signed, the signing time rests on the scanner's clock, and there is no checking mechanism at all. Everything described above — digest-bound content, an authority-anchored RFC 3161 time when an authority is configured, the chain — exists to give a counterparty facts instead of impressions.

The verification is public: anyone, including the counterparty, can run the check on the sealed PDF without an account. You do not have to trust the sending side's word; the evidence stands on its own.

What the data handling looks like

Originals, per-signature revisions and sealed finals are kept under the customer's retention settings — default maximums of 5 to 20 years by document type — then purged with cryptographic proof of erasure. For a remote signing, that covers the questions a counterparty (or their auditor) tends to ask next: where the records are, and for how long.

Sources

  • RFC 3161, Adams, Cain, Pinkas & Zuccherato, August 2001 — rfc-editor.org.
  • Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, articles 25, 26, 41, 42 — CELEX 32014R0910.
  • ETSI EN 319 142-1 (PAdES profile) — cited by name; paywalled standard.

This is an explanation of the process, not legal advice.

Read next

How to sign a PDF online, step by step

The end-to-end mechanics of signing a PDF online, from upload to sealed file.

What a PAdES B-T signature actually proves (and what it does not)

What the sealed contract proves, fact by fact.