Set it once, forget the banner
Acrobat shows an unacceptable signature banner? Install the Signattio trust root once
Adobe Acrobat checks signatures against the certificate lists it ships with. The Signattio signing root is not on those lists (that is correct — it is ours), so Acrobat asks before trusting it. This playbook installs the root once, after which every Signattio-signed document validates cleanly in the reading tools you already use.
Trust the root in Adobe Acrobat or Reader
Windows and macOS Reader both ship the same trust flow:
1. Open the signed PDF and open the signature panel in the left sidebar.
2. Click Signature Details (or right-click the signature field) and open the Certificate tab in the dialog.
3. At the top of the chain, the self-signed root is at the root of the issuer chain (marked "(untrusted)"). Select it and click Add to Trusted Certificates.
4. In the trust dialog, tick Use this certificate as a trusted root and Certified documents; save.
5. Reopen the document: the signature panel now shows the green check mark.
Alternative path without a signed document open: Edit > Preferences (Reader)/Acrobat [Great] > Signatures > Identities & Trusted Certificates > Import. Same certificate, same trust anchor.
Trust the root on macOS system tools
macOS validates signatures with its own chain engine:
1. Ask the document's author (the envelope sender) for the root certificate file (.pem or .crt) if they have not shared it.
2. Open Keychain Access, pick the System keychain, and drag the certificate file in.
3. Double-click the imported certificate, expand Trust, and mark it Always Trust for X.509 policy.
4. Close the window and confirm the system password. Preview and other Mac readers validate through the system trust chain from this state.
What the signature still proves without any extra install
Every Signattio envelope carries its own evidence pack: the audit-trail chain hash, signer identity method, signature appearances and a hidden immutable evidence certificate. The reader's banner is about its own trust stores only; the package's evidence is independent of how your reader is set up.
To check a document without installing anything, open the verification page embedded in the delivery email — the verification code is also printed inside the evidence certificate.
When to ask for more
The baseline profiles cover routine business flows only when the level actually reached supports them; check the PAdES level recorded in your evidence pack. If your legal team needs a qualified signature, use a qualified trust service provider; this service provides an advanced signature with evidence, not a qualified one.
Sources
- Adobe: trust certificates, digital signatures and the AATL — Adobe Help Center (helpx.adobe.com).
- Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, articles 25, 41 and 42 — CELEX 32014R0910.
- ETSI EN 319 142-1 — PAdES digital signatures.
- RFC 3161 — TSP Time-Stamp Protocol (Adams, Cain, Pinkas, Zuccherato, 2001).
This is a configuration guide for common readers, not legal or IT-security advice.
Read next
Inside the timestamp token: RFC 3161 fields and the article 41/42 presumptions.
Check a document end-to-end with the verification code — no install needed.
Byte-level detail of what the evidence pack asserts about us.
Where B-T/B-LT sits on the eIDAS ladder — and when the law asks for more.